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*AMENDED BLD-160      NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 16-1326 
___________ 
 
IN RE:  RANDY BAADHIO, 
             Petitioner 
____________________________________ 
 
On a Petition for Writ of Mandamus from the 
United States District Court for the District of New Jersey 
(Related to D.N.J. Civ. Nos. 15-cv-02444, 15-cv-02752, and 15-cv-08809) 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Rule 21, Fed. R. App. P. 
March 1, 2016 
 
Before:  FUENTES, KRAUSE and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed:  March 3, 2016) 
_________ 
 
OPINION* 
_________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Randy Baadhio is a plaintiff in the civil actions docketed at D.N.J. Civ. Nos. 15-
cv-02444, 15-cv-02752, and 15-cv-08809.  Presently before us is Baadhio’s petition for a 
writ of mandamus essentially seeking:  an order “reversing the district court order [in No. 
15-cv-08809] denying Emergency Removal from the Sleepy Hollow Motel” and 
“compelling the State of New Jersey . . . to pay for adequate rental housing”; the 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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immediate recusal “of the US District Court, Trenton, in this matter and all others”; and 
the “transfer of all cases to another District Court pending [a] decision on appeal.”  See 
Mandamus Pet. at 1, 8.  We will deny the petition. 
 Mandamus is a drastic remedy that is granted only in extraordinary cases.  In re 
Diet Drugs Prods. Liab. Litig., 418 F.3d 372, 378 (3d Cir. 2005).  To demonstrate that 
mandamus is appropriate, a petitioner must establish that he has “no other adequate 
means” to obtain the relief requested, and that he has a “clear and indisputable” right to 
issuance of the writ.  Madden v. Myers, 102 F.3d 74, 79 (3d Cir. 1996).  Baadhio seeks 
mandamus relief because he believes that District Judge Michael Shipp, as well as other 
District Judges and Magistrate Judges from the District of New Jersey, should recuse due 
to, inter alia, their alleged lack of impartiality and unnamed ethical violations.  Baadhio 
asserts that Judge Shipp’s partiality, in particular, has resulted in the erroneous denial of 
injunctive relief and in forma pauperis status in Civ. No. 15-cv-08809. 
 A mandamus petition is a proper means of challenging a District Judge’s refusal to 
recuse pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 455.  See In re Sch. Asbestos Litig., 977 F.2d 764, 775 (3d 
Cir. 1992).  The District Court entered an order on February 5, 2016, permitting Baadhio 
leave to reopen his civil action at No. 15-cv-08809 by submitting the filing fee on or 
before March 14, 2016.  If Baadhio remits the fee, the District Court will then consider 
the merits of the recusal motion that it had previously found to be moot.  When a District 
Judge has yet to refuse a request for recusal, it cannot be said that the petitioner has no 
recourse but to seek the extraordinary remedy of mandamus from this Court.  See In re 
Kensington Int’l Ltd., 353 F.3d 211, 224 (3d Cir. 2003).  Upon reopening, the District 
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Court would also consider Baadhio’s request for injunctive relief.  We note that any order 
denying leave to proceed in forma pauperis and/or for injunctive relief can be challenged 
on appeal.  Thus, we conclude that Baadhio cannot make the required showing that he 
has no other adequate means to attain the desired relief. 
 It likewise appears that Baadhio’s motions for recusal remain pending in his civil 
actions at Nos. 15-cv-02444 and 15-cv-02752.  Moreover, although mandamus may be 
warranted when a district court’s “undue delay is tantamount to a failure to exercise 
jurisdiction,” Madden, 102 F.3d at 79, the underlying civil actions do not present such a 
situation.  At the time Baadhio filed his mandamus petition, his motions for recusal had 
been pending in Nos. 15-cv-02444 and 15-cv-02752 for less than two weeks.  We do not 
hesitate to conclude that this time period “does not yet rise to the level of a denial of due 
process.”  Id. (stating that several months of inaction is insufficient to warrant mandamus 
relief).  We are confident that the district court will rule on Baadhio’s filings in due 
course. 
 Baadhio’s mandamus petition also contains what can be viewed as a request to 
change venue.  The express terms of 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) provide that a district court may 
transfer civil actions from one district court to another.  While the Supreme Court has 
found that a court of appeals may effect a transfer by direct order where “unusual 
circumstances” require “extraordinary action,” see Koehring Co. v. Hyde Constr. Co., 
382 U.S. 362, 364-65 (1966), no such unusual circumstances appear based on Baadhio’s 
petition.  To the extent that Baadhio may be seeking to disqualify the District Judges 
sitting in the District of New Jersey based on alleged bias and prejudice, his petition does 
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not establish that a reasonable person, with knowledge of all the facts, would conclude 
that the District Judges’ impartiality might reasonably be questioned.  See 28 U.S.C. § 
455(a); In re Kensington Int’l Ltd., 353 F.3d at 220; see also In re United States, 666 F.2d 
690, 694 (1st Cir. 1981) (holding that recusal is not required on the basis of 
“unsupported, irrational, or highly tenuous speculation”). 
 Accordingly, we will deny Baadhio’s mandamus petition.  Baadhio’s request that 
we rule on his petition in an expedited manner is denied as moot.1  
 
                                              
1  We note that on February 29, 2016, Baadhio filed an emergency motion for injunctive 
relief seeking an order to bar the State of New Jersey from terminating his emergency 
housing assistance effective March 2, 2016.  A litigant “seeking a preliminary injunction 
must establish that he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer 
irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in 
his favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.”  Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. 
Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008).  Given our analysis and disposition of Baadhio’s 
mandamus petition, it is obvious that he has failed to establish a likelihood of success on 
the merits in the context of this proceeding.  Additionally, it appears that he has been 
afforded an opportunity to request a hearing and to request that his benefits be continued 
until that hearing takes place.  See Emergency Mot. at 11-12.  However, Petitioner 
apparently has not pursued those opportunities to date.  *Accordingly, we deny his 
emergency motion, but we will do so without prejudice to his filing the motion in the 
appropriate District Court action. 
